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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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13 November 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*OK*

USSR-Berlin: The Soviet notes of 11 November to the three Western powers protesting West German draft legislation of 30 September to create a new radio system, including a station in West Berlin, reflect Moscow's continuing sensitivity to any West German claims of jurisdiction in the city. The notes were apparently timed to focus attention on this issue when the West German upper house considers the legislation on 13 November. Moscow's action also suggests an attempt to probe Western willingness to restrain Bonn from actions which could be interpreted as violating the "improved international atmosphere." Moscow probably hopes to use this issue to further its effort to brand Bonn as the principal obstacle to an international detente.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

*T/0* **Morocco:** Premier Ibrahim on 10 November again rejected the proposed five-year tenure for the American air bases in Morocco and declined to make a counterproposal. [REDACTED]

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*T/0* **Iraq:** The pro-Communist People's Court president, Col. Mahdawi, has been marked for assassination by UAR-supported elements in Iraq. [REDACTED]

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*T/0* Nasir has approved the carrying out of the assassination by Iraqi Baathists or by members of the Moslem Brotherhood. This report is not confirmed, but Mahdawi is Nasir's most vocal enemy in Iraq. [REDACTED]

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*O/* **Burma:** The impressive showing of former Premier U Nu's political faction in the two municipal elections held under General Ne Win's regime indicates that Nu's popular following in urban areas has not waned. The wide margins of victory achieved

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in the face of army preference for the opposing faction, as well as the latter's superior party organization, improves Nu's prospects for a political comeback in the national elections scheduled for early 1960. (The army is reviewing its plans for controlling the next government.)

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*OIC*  
Japan: Prospects for the growth of a responsible anti-Communist labor movement in Japan, headed by the moderate Zenro labor federation, have improved following the recent split in the Socialist party. Elements from two key labor unions have withdrawn from the Communist-dominated Sohyo labor federation, and announced their support for the proposed Democratic Socialist party, which is backed by Zenro. The membership of Zenro at present is only one fourth that of Sohyo.

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### III. THE WEST

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Moscow Protests West German Plans to Create New Radio Station in West Berlin

The USSR's 11 November notes to the three Western powers protesting West German Government plans to create a new radio station in West Berlin reflect Moscow's continuing sensitivity to any implied assertion of West German legal jurisdiction in the city. The notes allege that the Geneva foreign ministers' conference "confirmed" that West Berlin has never been a part of West Germany and cited other examples of "illegal" West German interference in Berlin affairs. Soviet preoccupation with the legal relationship between Bonn and Berlin was also evident in Khrushchev's remark to Austrian President Schaerf on 13 October that he could envisage any solution of the Berlin problem except the absorption of West Berlin by West Germany.

The notes were apparently timed to focus attention on the issue when the West German upper house considers the legislation on 13 November. Moscow is also probably seeking to probe Western willingness to restrain Bonn from actions which would be open to interpretation by Moscow as violation of the "spirit of Camp David" atmosphere. Bonn is specifically charged with a "premeditated" attempt to interfere with the "successful conclusion of forthcoming negotiations."

The proposed establishment of a long-wave radio station in West Berlin is a part of a plan to establish some measure of federal control over radio and television facilities. According to the draft law, the new station, "Deutschland-Funk," would broadcast "to the whole of Germany." The proposal, approved on 30 September by the cabinet, has run into heavy opposition from the states, which now control broadcasting. Local observers feel the law may ultimately be passed, but only after protracted negotiations and perhaps a constitutional court test. [redacted] 25X1

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Moroccan Premier Again Rejects Proposed Tenure for American Bases

Moroccan Premier Abdullah Ibrahim on 10 November again rejected a US proposal that the five American air bases in Morocco be retained for another five years. He reiterated the argument he used in Washington last month that this period is too long. Ibrahim added that submission of this offer to his cabinet would create ill feeling without serving any useful purpose. He declined to make a counterproposal, but suggested that the United States might release the Boulhaut base as was tentatively proposed to King Mohamed V last summer.

The King reportedly stated that a calendar of evacuation might range from two to five years, depending on "the ability of the Moroccan armed forces to assume maintenance and control of the bases."

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Burmese Ex-Premier U Nu's Political Prospects Improved

Sweeping victories of U Nu's "Clean" Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in municipal elections on 10 September and 11 November have improved his prospects for a political comeback in the national elections now projected for early 1960. In the central Burma town of Pakokku, the "Clean" candidates won all 21 council seats despite the superior party organization of former Premier Ba Swe's "Stable" AFPFL faction and the known preference of army leaders for the Ba Swe group.

U Nu's personal appeal and political acumen appear to have combined to offset his record of maladministration following the 1958 split in the AFPFL. He has succeeded in portraying his forced resignation in September 1958 in favor of General Ne Win as an act of political self-sacrifice for the good of the country. Since then, leaving political campaigning primarily to his lieutenants, he has rebuilt his popular image as a selfless national and religious leader above partisan politics.

Although General Ne Win is reportedly committed to national elections in early 1960, he is also convinced that army reforms and army influence in government must continue following the elections, and he is reportedly unsympathetic to U Nu. His army subordinates, particularly Colonel Maung Maung, are dissatisfied with the election prospects, predicting the return of dilatory and inefficient government under civilian politicians, and are seeking means of ensuring a satisfactory degree of behind-the-scenes control. In both the 1952 and 1956 elections army intervention played a crucial role in obtaining AFPFL victories.

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### Japanese Socialist Split Strengthens Labor Moderates

The faction led by Suehiro Nishio which withdrew from the Japanese Socialist party plans to form a new Democratic Socialist party in early 1960. This gives the moderate anti-Communist Zenro labor federation a long-sought political vehicle for competing with the large, extreme leftist Sohyo federation.

In the wake of the Socialist split, an estimated 10 percent of the 400,000 members in the National Railway Workers' Union and a smaller group in the Coal Miners' Union have announced their support of the Nishio group, which Zenro backs. These unions rank second and fifth in size, respectively, among Sohyo's component unions. Zenro, which has about 800,000 members but is less than one quarter as large as Sohyo, is increasing its efforts to attract members from unions which have maintained reluctant affiliation with Sohyo because of the latter's domination of the Socialist party, heretofore labor's only political voice.

Zenro's concentration on strictly labor objectives, its opposition to labor participation in leftist-sponsored "political struggles," and the relatively greater success of its member unions in gaining wage increases in important industries have received widespread press endorsement and may tend to attract new members.

Significant expansion of Zenro will depend on successful formation by Nishio of an effective political party. [redacted]

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